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A key driver of market education experimentation in England since the 1980s has 
been a focus on improved conditions for school autonomy and devolved 
management through greater privatisation management of education services and 
public-private partnerships, reduced local government bureaucracy and oversight, 
and maximum delegation of financial and managerial responsibilities to school 
leaders and governors.  In 2010 the scope and scale of these reforms were enlarged 
significantly through the expansion of the academies programme which led to large 
numbers of schools operating outside local government jurisdiction.  The roll back of 
local government made possible and encouraged by these reforms has not only 
given rise to concerns over a regulation gap but intensified scrutiny of the role of 
school governors.  Worried that some school governors are ineffective at holding 
school leaders to account for the educational and financial performance of schools, 
government and non-government actors and organisations have intervened in 
various ways to promote new forms of institutional reflexivity and professionalisation 
designed to embed self-governance and mitigate ‘governance failure’.  In this 
chapter I examine how school governors are called upon to take responsibility for 
various strategic-management priorities against the background of receding 
government control, while at the same time appear to be implicated in various 
technologies of rational self-management that strengthen the continuation and 
exercise of government control.  An additional, related focus of the chapter therefore 
concerns the contradictions and vagaries of these reforms, namely the contraction 






Since 2010 the education system in England has been reformed to help bring about 
significant changes to the way schools are governed.  A key driver of these reforms 
has been the academies programme – a flagship policy of Blair’s Labour government 
in 2000 that was later adopted and developed by the Coalition government in 2010 
(a cooperation between the Conservative and Liberal Democratic party).  Like many 
education reforms that have been rolled out by national and federal governments 
across the globe, the academies programme aims to facilitate school autonomy and 
devolved management through removing the necessity for traditional structures of 
government, specifically local government involvement in premises management, 
human-resource management, funding allocation and support services.  Similar 
trends in education management reform can be traced to South Africa (Bush and 
Heystek 2003), Australia (Gobby 2013), New Zealand (Jacbos 2000) and the United 
States (Keddie 2016), albeit the speed and scale of these reforms varies between 
countries due to the sensitivity of their geographical divisions of administrative-
political rule and their historical trajectories as nation states bound to specific cultural 
and political ideals.  In the United States, for example, school autonomy and 
devolved management as envisioned through the charter school movement has 
given way to rampant privatisation and commodification of public education in which 
private companies receive government subsidies to run schools on a for-profit basis 
(Keddie 2016).  In contrast, schools in England run by businesses, universities and 
charities are permitted to run publicly-funded schools only as private limited 
companies on a non-profit basis which means that any surplus or ‘profit’ is returned 




A driving philosophy of the academies programme in England since 2010 has been 
to ‘create a school system which is more effectively self-improving’ (DfE 2010: 73) 
and where schools, primarily through shared management structures and improved 
economies of scale enabled through school clusters, networks and chains, ‘operate 
in strong, resilient structures that work to drive up standards’ (DfE 2016: 16).  To 
support this vision of a self-improving schools system, the legal framework 
underpinning the academies programme makes it possible for schools to take control 
of their finances, curriculum, admissions policy (subject to the admissions code) and 
conditions of employment, among other strategic-management priorities.  But the 
academies programme entails more than a legal or technical redefinition of schools.  
Organisationally and culturally, the process of converting to an academy can mean 
displacing or appropriating certain structures and practices to make way for new 
forms of alternative development that are not always consistent with, and in some 
cases undermine, democratic principles of stakeholder governance (Wilkins 2017, 
2019a), namely a model of school governance ‘designed to ensure representation of 
key stakeholders’ (DfES 2005: 7) through a focus on ‘community cohesion’ 
(Education and Inspections Act 2006: Part 3, Section 38).   
 
The dramatic shift from a stakeholder model of school governance to a skills-based 
model of governance (Wilkins 2016; Young 2016) is both a condition and 
consequence of the reforms.  As more schools operate as academies with wide 
discretion over finances, purchasing and staff pay and conditions, the external 
pressure on schools to reconstitute and depoliticise their governing bodies (with 
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appointments subject to skills and competency assessments) has been 
overwhelmingly successfully in diminishing the agonistic character of school 
governance with its focus on proportional representation and community 
participation.  In some cases, local governing bodies (LGBs) have been removed 
completely to make way for multi-academy trusts (MATs) in which a single board of 
trustees are responsible for running multiple schools: 
 
The growth of MATs will improve the quality of governance – meaning that the 
best governing boards will take responsibility for more schools. As fewer, 
more highly skilled boards take more strategic oversight of the trust’s schools, 
MAT boards will increasingly use professionals to hold individual school-level 
heads to account for educational standards and the professional management 
of the school (DfE 2016: 50). 
 
As Rayner, Courtney and Gunter (2018: 143) argue, the academies programme is a 
form of ‘system redesign’ that not only challenges the role of local democratic 
accountability as a framing for governance legitimacy, but which introduces and 
celebrates new cultures of professionalism, managerialism and leadership against 
which local government bureaucracy is increasingly judged to be too political, 
unresponsive or inefficient.  According to the Coalition government in 2010, the 
academies programme helps to facilitate innovation and organisational 
responsiveness through alleviating the need for ‘automatic compliance’ (DfE 2010: 
13) and ‘the approach of trying to control improvement from the centre’ (DfE 2010: 
73).  Yet, as this chapter will show, the realities of ‘academisation’ as experienced by 
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many school governors is rational self-management in the shadow of the state.  The 
academies programme can be accurately described as an expression of 
‘decentralised centralism’ (Karlsen 2000: 525) since it shifts power away from 
traditional structures of government and disperses it outwards and downwards 
towards schools and communities, but then compels those same schools and 
communities to adhere rigorously to centrally-mandated rules, regulations and laws.  
Rational self-management, therefore, is not something organisations and actors 
enter into spontaneously or independently.  Rather, it is something that organisations 
and actors are trained and enjoined to become by way of structural incentives, 
ethical injunctions and rule setting/enforcement imposed by different configurations 
and species of state (and non-state) intervention.   
 
Foucault (1982: 790) characterised ‘government’ as ‘modes of action, more or less 
considered or calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action 
of other people’.  The suggestion here, among others, is that the exercise of state 
power is not strictly coercive nor is it confined to the actions of specific organisations 
and agents or traceable to discrete ‘events’, ‘structures’ and ‘cultures’.  Rather, the 
exercise of modern state power, according to Foucault (1997: 82), functions through 
‘techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour’ and which ‘seek to 
purport ‘truths’ about who we are or what we should be’ (McKee 2009: 468).  
Following this line of argument, this chapter explores the ways in which government 
and para-government organisations and actors intervene to shape the conduct of 
school governors through perfecting the design of technologies of rational self-
management.  These technologies, as evidenced and discussed in the sections that 
follow, function at three interrelated levels.  On one level, they seek to carve out 
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professional spaces that limit participation to those school governors who can satisfy 
narrowly bounded judgements about ‘educational excellence’ and ‘good governance’ 
and who can consolidate and manage the ever-deepening marketisation of 
education and its consequences.  Viewed from a different perspective, these 
technologies function to produce school governors that are more knowable and 
predictable from the perspective of external authorities.  Technologies of rational 
self-management are pre-emptive tools designed to mitigate the worst excesses of 
unregulated markets and moral hazard.  On another level, these technologies 
establish a convergence of interest between political authorities and the strategies of 
school governors, in effect strengthening relations of accountability between schools 
and central government.  Technologies of rational self-management therefore 
constitute ‘key fidelity techniques in new strategies of government’ (Rose 1999: 152).   
 
The academies revolution 
 
Alongside Chile, the US and Sweden, England has long been considered one of the 
leading countries in market education experimentation (Ginsberg et al. 2010; 
Lubienski 2013; Lundahl et al. 2013; Wilkins 2016).  For almost 40 years, successive 
governments in England have introduced a system of incentives and punishments 
designed to compel schools, teachers and parents to make decisions about the 
welfare and education of children on the basis of explicit economic models which 
include, but are not limited to, a narrow rational, instrumental focus on data and 
datatification (Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes 2017; Williamson 2017) and 
performance efficiency and performativity (Ball 2003; Perryman 2016).  Like many 
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education systems around the globe, parents in England are encouraged to navigate 
the education system as consumers by using league table results and performance 
indicators as framings for their school choice while schools, as transparent, publicly 
accountable organisations, are expected to organise themselves in response to such 
demands through improved systems of internal monitoring, self-evaluation and 
impression management (Wilkins 2012).  The application of economic theories to 
previously non-economic domains and practices are nowhere more evident or 
widespread than in the field of national and global education policy where market 
techniques operate as guiding principles for education governance (see Gobby, 
Keddie and Blackmore 2017; Grimaldi and Serpieri 2013; Hangartner and Svaton 
2013; Ozga 2009; Ranson 2010). 
 
The election victory of the Coalition government in England in 2010 not only 
signalled a continuation of these trends in market education experimentation but 
represented something far more seismic in terms of scale and reach.  Up until 2010 
the bulk of publicly-funded schools in England were governed under the authority of 
local government with only a handful of schools operating as ‘state-funded 
independent schools’ or academies.  Introduced by Blair’s Labour government in 
2000, the academies programme made it possible for interested charities and private 
companies to sponsor publicly-funded schools pursuant to a contract with the 
Secretary of State.  Between 1997 and 2010 the Labour government under Blair and 
Brown authorised the opening of 203 academies on the condition that these were 
under-performing schools that would benefit from a different management model.  
Not dissimilar to the legal setup of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) introduced 
under the terms of the Education Reform Act 1988 and the Local Management of 
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Schools (LMS), the academy model entails transferring non-executive powers to a 
separate legal entity known as an academy trust made up of a board of trustees who 
act as principal manager of the school’s assets. 
 
In 2010, the election of the Coalition government brought new impetus to these 
reforms with the introduction of the Academies Act 2010 which made it possible for 
all ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’ schools (and, for the first time, primary and special 
schools) to apply to the Department of Education (DfE) to convert to academy status.  
Statistics released by the DfE (2018) at the time of writing indicate there are 7,317 
open academies representing 30% of the total number of primary, secondary, 
special, and alternative provision schools in England.  The reasons for these 
conversions vary but key motivating factors include a desire to change the school 
leadership, to reconstitute the school governing body and to gain control over budget 
spending and improve economies of scale through increased efficiency savings (DfE 
2017).  On the other hand, many schools wishing to remain local-government-
controlled have converted to academy status on the advice of their local government.  
Due to cuts to local government spending and the restructuring and outsourcing of 
traded services to social enterprises, businesses and community organisations, 
many schools can no longer rely on local government to take responsibility for their 
back-office functions, support services and management overheads.  Feeling 
vulnerable and isolated, schools in such circumstances typically form their own MAT 
by way of pooling resources, jointly buying-in services, sharing expertise and 
building collaboration and shared vision through cross-school committees (Wilkins 
2016), sometimes through co-operative structures and practices (Davidge, Facer 




The outsourcing of traditional state functions to citizens and communities is not 
unique to school governance, however, and should be read as part of a wider 
economic and political movement in many advanced liberal countries seeking to 
redefine the role of the state as ‘moderator and activator’ (Rosol 2012: 241).  Grek 
(2013: 696) usefully describes these developments as soft forms of governing that 
operate through ‘attraction’, in other words by ‘drawing people in to take part in 
processes of mediation, brokering and ‘translation’, and embedding self‐governance 
and steering at a distance through these processes and relations’.   
 
Implications for school governance 
 
Academies typically retain both a board of trustees and a school governing body.  
The role of school governors varies according to the scheme of delegation devised 
by the board of trustees, however.  In a ‘converter academy’ for example, sometimes 
called a stand-alone academy, the difference between the school governing body 
and the board of trustees is less apparent as members of the board of trustees also 
act as school governors and vice versa.  Converter academies are schools which 
have converted to academy status by choice, usually on the basis that they are 
academically high-performing schools who wish to acquire greater control over their 
finances and non-executive powers to enter into contracts and employ staff.  In 
contrast, ‘sponsored academies’ are previously local government-run schools that 
have been deemed by the national inspectorate, the Office for Standards in 
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Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted), eligible for takeover by a sponsor 
such as a business, university, other school, faith group or voluntary group.   
 
In circumstances where a school is forcibly removed from local government control 
to become a sponsored academy within a chain of schools managed by a large 
foundation called a MAT, the school is typically stripped of its assets and any legal 
entitlement to self-determination (NCTL 2014).  The decision-making powers of 
school governors – assuming the MAT wishes to retain their voluntary services after 
the takeover – diminishes significantly in these contexts as non-executive powers 
are concentred among the board of trustees who, in the interests of efficiency and 
economies of scale, anchor schools to a prescriptive, command and control 
governance setup that requires them to adhere to standard operational procedures 
in terms of teaching, learning and assessment (Stewart 2016).  A government survey 
of 326 multi-academy trusts in 2017 revealed that just 7% of academies in trusts of 
more than 11 schools have full control over their teaching and learning (DfE 2017).  
In most cases, however, schools operating within a MAT are typically comprised of 
2-3 academies, sometimes called a soft federation or ‘collaborative trust’, in which 
schools retain their own governing body while strategic-management priorities and 
decision-making powers are dispersed equitably through the creation of joint, cross-
school committees (Salokangas and Chapman 2014). 
 
The impact of these education reforms is various from the perspective of macro- and 
micro-level operations and functions.  From a macro-level perspective, school 
funding is no longer funnelled through local government to be distributed to schools 
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but instead is channelled directly to the school and its board of trustees.  Moreover, 
the hollowing out of local government has produced a regulation gap or ‘missing 
middle’ (Hill 2012) coupled with growing public concern over a democratic deficit 
(Unison 2010).  From a micro-level perspective, namely at the level of the school, the 
implications of ‘academisation’ suggest fundamental changes to the way schools 
organise themselves in terms of making a pragmatic adjustment to the conditions 
and requirements of devolved management or rational self-management.  These 
changes – what Hatcher (2006: 599) describes as a process of ‘re-agenting’ – 
includes increased ‘professionalisation’ of the school governing body through a focus 
on expert administration, audit rituals and performance evaluation practised by 
suitably qualified, skilled, experienced individuals (Wilkins 2016).  Increasingly, 
school governors face huge pressures to ‘modernise’ their practices in response to 
calls for ‘professional governance to move beyond the current ‘amateurish’ approach 
to overseeing schools’ (Wilshaw quoted in Cross 2014), for ‘more business people 
coming forward to become governors’ (Nash quoted in GOV.UK 2013; also see 
Burns 2018), preferably people with the ‘right skills’ (Morgan quoted in GOV.UK 
2015), and a focus on ‘quality’ rather than ‘democratic accountability’ (Graham Stuart 
quoted in Stuart 2014).   
 
In what follows I examine the increasingly technical-bureaucratic role of school 
governors as custodians of public accountability.  Specifically, I outline the criteria 
and evidentiary requirements against which persons are judged to be effective 
school governors, the multitude of responsibilities to which school governors are 
bound as a condition of their role, and the variety of evaluation tools and bodies of 
expert knowledge through which school governors are guided to carry out their role 
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and make their actions defensible.  In the final section I pull together these 
observations and arguments to reflect on some of the contradictions of school 
governance, namely a movement that liberates school governors from certain 
externalities and accountability infrastructures, specifically those linked to local 
government structures, while simultaneously implicating them in new forms of 
institutional reflexivity that contribute to the realisation of certain policy aims, key 




In 2010 the Ministerial Working Group on School Governance (DCSF 2010: 3) 
proposed the ‘requirement that all governing bodies have the necessary skills to 
carry out their tasks’ and ‘follow a defined set of principles for good governance’.  
Building on these recommendations, in 2012 the Coalition government (DfE 2012) 
produced a 200-page document specifying the role and responsibilities of school 
governors, this time emphasising the strategic role of school governors in overseeing 
the educational and financial performance of the school.  Later in 2013 the DfE 
(2013: 6) further characterised the role and responsibilities of school governors in the 
following way: ‘Ensuring clarity of vision, ethos and strategic direction’, ‘Holding the 
headteacher to account for the educational performance of the school and its pupils’ 
and ‘Overseeing the financial performance of the school and making sure its money 
is well spent’.  The national school’s inspectorate, Ofsted (2011: 4), provides a 
similar characterisation of the role by designating the importance of school governors 
to ‘the school’s self-evaluation’ and ‘shaping its strategic direction’.  While the role of 
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school governance in England has remained consistent in lots of ways, the core 
emphasis being that a group of elected and appointed volunteers made of various 
stakeholders attest to the ‘quality’ of education provision on behalf of the community 
it serves (see Sallis 1988), the new demands placed on school governors has 
challenged the feasibility of maintaining a stakeholder model of school governance 
(Wilkins 2016). 
 
A further design and implication of this narrowing – or ‘professionalisation’ (Wilkins 
2016) – of the role is that the actions and decisions of school governors can be 
judged against specific criteria and evidentiary demands, thereby making school 
governors more amenable to external scrutiny and the requirements of various 
accountability measures, from ‘corporate/contract accountability’ to ‘performance 
accountability’ and ‘consumer accountability’ (Ranson 2010: 467-473).  These 
accountability measures are reflected in the various responsibilities to which school 
governors are bound as custodians of public accountability.  These responsibilities 
include succession and strategic planning, pupil behaviour and attendance 
monitoring, admissions arrangements, risk assessment, school-to-school brokering 
and generating business links and sponsorship, target setting, budget spending, 
performance evaluation and self-evaluation, skills audit, compliance checking, digital 
evaluation tools to monitor performance and foster competition, premises 
management, and purchasing goods and services through competitive tendering, 




Yet despite their legal status as academies and administratively self-governing 
entities, schools are also required to comply with certain laws and guidance on 
admissions and special educational needs and exclusions as well as adhere to rules 
for charity status as companies limited guarantee (academy proprietors constitute 
exempt charities, for example).  Moreover, school governors must provide the 
‘Memorandum’ or ‘Articles of Association’ outlining the rules for their own internal 
regulation and management to the DfE and anyone who requests it under the 
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000, together with statutory accounts that include 
an income and expenditure account, a statement of financial activities, a balance 
sheet and so forth.  In this sense, the ‘responsibilisation’ of school governors as 
agents of effective governance is provisionally secured through the alignment of 
freedom and obligation, where the freedom to govern is morally and ethically bound 
up with obligations to compliance and evaluation.  As Peeters (2013: 585) argues, 
‘government does not make citizens ‘responsible’, in the sense that the state steps 
back and lets citizens deal with societal problems themselves, but rather aims to 
obligate citizens: to make them ‘responsible’’. 
 
A consequence of these wide-ranging responsibilities is that school governing bodies 
are compelled to engage with new forms of self-evaluation and increase the stock of 
their technical-administrative knowledge to cope with the ever-growing demands for 
improved ‘quality of school governance’ (DfE 2016: 50).  Increasingly school 
governors are making use of new digital evaluation tools called ‘data dashboards’, 
specifically the DfE School Comparison Tool and Analyse School Performance 
(ASP), to meet ever-growing demands for improved transparency, accountability and 
efficiency.  School governors use these digital evaluation tools not only to improve 
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their performance monitoring as overseers and appraisers of the educational and 
financial performance of the school, but to enhance the transparency of the internal 
operation of the school to others and to make themselves accountable as persons 
effective in this role. 
   
As Rhodes (1996: 655) argues, ‘This transformation of the public sector involves 
‘less government’ (or less rowing) but ‘more governance’ (or more steering)’.  The 
changing role and responsibilities of school governors is a good illustration of what 
Rhodes (1996) means by ‘less government’ but ‘more governance’ – or what 
Swyngedouw (2005: 1992) calls ‘governance-beyond-the-state’.  Education policies 
that promote ‘state retreat’ naturally give way to wider concerns about ‘governance 
failure’ and the desire for improved performance management and ‘risk-based 
regulation’ (Hutter 2005).  Governance failure can be characterised in a number of 
ways but primarily it refers to structures or processes that impede the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the internal operation of an organisation.   
 
In the case of school governance, governance failure occurs when there is improper 
and ineffective internal monitoring of the school’s financial and educational 
performance or where there is evidence of statutory non-compliance, lack of 
challenge and support to school leaders, related party transactions and nominated 
supplier corruption, and financial mismanagement or scandal (see Boffey 2013; 
Mansell 2016; Perraudin 2017).  Governance-beyond-the-state therefore aims to 
create a system of rules, regulations and laws designed to compel certain 
‘professional’ or moral behaviours that sustain practices of ‘good governance’ among 
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different actors and organisations in the absence of direct government intervention.  
The suggestion here is that, despite new trends in school governance that 
emphasise school autonomy, devolved management and self-management, the 
state is no less active in ‘setting rules and establishing an enforcement mechanism 
designed to control the operation of the system’s constituent institutions, instruments 
and markets’ (Spotton 1999: 971; also see Levi-Faur 2005). 
 
The emphasis on schools slimming down their governing bodies, professionalising 
existing school governors through suitable induction and training, and appointing 
only suitably qualified, skilled school governors, preferably those from the business 
and financial sectors, has been a key driver of policy rhetoric and policy 
recommendations following the Academies Act 2010.  In their 2011 report, 
Carmichael and Wild (2011: 13) recommended that government should actively 
recruit governors from the business sector and stressed that ‘governors should be 
appointed on the breadth of skills and experience they would bring’.  Echoing this, 
the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Schools Lord Nash said: 
‘Running a school is in many ways like running a business, so we need more 
business people coming forward to become governors’ (Nash quoted in GOV.UK 
2013).  From this perspective, a vital responsibility of school governors is the smooth 
bureaucratic management of schools as ‘high-reliability’ organisations or businesses.  
More recently the then Education Secretary Nicky Morgan remarked: 
 
What that doesn’t necessarily mean is a stakeholder model of school 
governance, and I should be clear now that I intend to look further into how 
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we can move away from that model over this Parliament - because what 
makes your contribution so important isn’t the particular group you represent, 
it’s the skills, expertise and wisdom you bring to the running of a school.  
(GOV.UK 2015).   
 
The direction of travel outlined above suggests that a stakeholder model of school 
governance envisioned by previous governments (see DfES 2005) has been 
displaced or undermined in favour of new arrangements to ‘professionalise’ or 
‘modernise’ school governing bodies in order to enhance expert administration and 
quality control of the internal operation of schools in line with the requirements of 
external regulators and funders.  The vulnerabilities and insecurities attached to 
micro-systems of devolvement management does not necessarily mean that 
proportional representation on governing bodies or a focus on community 
involvement and civic training as a focus governance is no longer feasible among 
schools, however.  While the scope of school governance has certainly changed 
dramatically under reforms to make it more specialised and juridified, there is 
evidence in England of schools working through co-operative means and structures 
to ‘provide a real alternative to state, private and corporate sponsorship of 
competition as the only approach to the organisation of the mainstream school 
system’ (Davidge, Facer and Schostak 2015: 61).  In what follows I reflect on how 
the changing responsibilities of school governors already discussed helps to 
illuminate the contradictory logic at the heart of school governance. 
 




Since 2010 the importance of school governance to education in England has 
steadily increased as large numbers of schools choose to become academies or, 
due to poor academic performance, are deemed eligible for takeover by a new 
management structure operated by large academy trust or MAT.  The insecurities 
and risks attached to these reforms mean that government and non-government 
actors and organisations, from secretaries of state for education and governance 
consultants to business leaders and national leaders of governance, have intervened 
as a matter of priority or opportunity to influence the way schools govern themselves, 
primarily through technologies of rational self-management. 
 
Rational self-management (broadly conceived) is a condition for ‘good governance’ 
since it aims to foster the adaptive capacities of subjects to navigate and calculate 
new risk environments as administratively self-governing management groups or 
leadership teams.  At the same time, rational self-management tends to cohere 
around poles of efficient/inefficient, professional/amateur, active/passive – what 
Foucault (2000: 326) calls ‘dividing practices’.  Technologies of rational self-
management rely on these dividing practices to compel certain behaviours and 
attitudes defined as acceptable or ‘normal’, preferably those that are amenable to 
audit and ‘modes of objectification’ (Foucault 2000: 326).  These modes of 
objectification then make it possible for the self to be externally assessed, sorted and 
ranked according to which behaviour is performed, thus providing unique 
opportunities for external authorities, in this case government and para-government 
organisations, to assess and guide how public organisations govern themselves – 
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what Cooper (1998: 12) calls ‘governing at a distance’.  Rational self-management, 
therefore, can be considered both a technology of government and a technology of 
the self since it ‘implicates citizens as co-operators of political will formation’ (Peeters 
2013: 589). 
 
These modes of intervention or ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ (Swyngedouw 2005: 
1992) are designed to establish vital, albeit ‘fragile relays’ (Rose 1999: 50) that help 
to connect the formally autonomous operations of school governors with the political 
will government, in effect opening up spaces for ‘linking political objectives and 
personal conduct’ (Rose 1999: 149).  To fully understand the responsibilities of 
school governors, therefore, means looking beyond what government mandates 
school governors to do and instead conceiving responsibility as a spectrum or 
modality that is negotiated at the intersection of national government policy 
imperatives and locally situated dilemmas and normative commitments.  The 
implication being that political objectives and personal conduct, or policy and 
practice, are not identical and reducible to each other.   
 
Policy enactments are held together and fall apart according to ‘specific semiotic, 
social, institutional and spatiotemporal fixes’ (Jessop and Sum 2016: 108) and 
therefore are better understood as contingent, complex assemblages that emerge 
through ‘creative processes of interpretation and recontextualisation’ (Ball, Maguire 
and Braun 2012: 3; also see Wilkins 2019b).  Devolved management and school 
autonomy, in theory, enriches possibilities for such creativity by making it possible for 
schools to pursue certain freedoms, namely wide discretion over finances and 
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purchasing and the capacity to innovate through curricular experimentation 
(although, in reality, most schools are culturally and operationally ‘risk-averse’, see 
Trafford 2018).  As more schools adopt their own legal and management structures, 
however, the relationship between policy and practice becomes increasingly messy 
and unmanageable.  Nonetheless, external authorities, be it regulators or funders, 
continually strive to hold schools to account for specific purposes, agendas or 
priorities in the interest of maintaining public accountability.   
 
A key priority of government and non-government organisations and actors is to 
develop strategies and tools for ‘coping with complexity’ (Jessop 2003: 3).  Audit 
cultures (Power 1997), performativity regimes (Ball 2003) and other related 
techniques of government, namely inspection, managerial deference and high-
stakes testing, are central to such complex management, albeit requiring local actors 
like school governors to implement them.  Superficially and provisionally, these 
technologies of rational self-management help to produce schools that are amenable 
to capture from meta-analyses and systems and relations of ‘commensurability, 
equivalence and comparative performance’ (Lingard, Martino and Rezai-Rashti 
2016: 542).  The idea here is that all schools, regardless of their specific social 
arrangements and value structures, can be subject to like-for-like comparisons using 
‘impersonal market reasoning’ (Dean 2015: 139) to determine their transparency, 
accountability and efficiency.   
 
The development of education policies like school autonomy and devolved 
management, epitomised by the academies programme, has meant that schools to 
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varying degrees have been both liberated from and ensnared by different hierarchies 
of knowledge, regulatory frameworks and modes of governance.  A key 
consequence of this shift towards greater school autonomy and devolved 
management has been what Peck (2010: 23) calls ‘an explosion of “market 
conforming” regulatory incursions’.  This is especially evident among the work 
performed by school governors whose primary responsibilities now include 
maintaining the financial integrity of the school as a competitive business, providing 
a strategic role in future-proofing the school against multitudinous risks and 
governance failure, and making the internal operation of the school amenable to 
scrutiny and appraisal by external regulators.  From this perspective, school 
governance can be regarded as a self-contradictory movement that flits between 
modulated social adjustment based on a pragmatic acceptance of state authority and 
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